A watershed moment. A divorce made official by document. Publishing its New National Strategy, Russia de facto and de jure assumes a strategic posture and a clear set of policies that make official its disengagement from Europe and the West. Given that this means not just an isolationist stance but in fact a rather offensive posture in Russia’s near abroad – Europe’s neighborhood or even backyard – what Russia officially presents here is a policy of antagonism towards the West (NATO and EU in particular). For those that think otherwise this is not in response and it is nothing like EU and NATO enlargement. While this shave constantly been interpreted by Russia as challenging its sphere of influence, they never threatened Russian stability and security and one can argue were never really intended or designed to counter Russian interest. If anything Russia greatly benefited economically (and politically) from its opening towards Europe and the west. NATO and EU enlargement and rapprochement to countries in the former communist bloc were also driven by a clearly expressed political desire of the new member states and new independent states of the former USSR. None of these steps involved arming separatist militias, creating alternative separatist so called “governments” using foreign agents, shooting down planes civilian and military, using energy as a pressure instrument, limiting the policy choices of sovereign countries and certainly it did not involve invading sovereign territories. Under the circumstances and on top of the dire crises in Ukraine, this New Russian National Strategy is a big step-back for Russia and its people. While it is presented as a strengthening of its defence sector, its domestic industry and manufacturing as well as agriculture and food sectors this is a thin veil over a decade of failed economic policies. Russia did not do the reforms needed to substitute imports and reduce its huge GDP reliance on energy and mineral resources exports while all but integrated in the global markets. Now, cutting itself away and antagonising its best customers and investment partners has even lower chances of doing so. In the meanwhile it is getting cosy with its real strategic competitors all to glad to get good terms for access to Russia’s intellectual and natural resources. Getting out of the horrible case of dutch disease would be a good thing for Russia. Only this soft divorce and certainly unamiable separation from the West is not a credible path. For one, Russia’s main investment and technology partners are getting more and more reluctant and its economy is bleeding domestic and foreign money. It remains to be seen if it does have the technological, financial and human capacity to keep this new national strategy credible while maintaining public support for the central authority in Kremlin and the territorial coherence of the Federation. I am utterly sad to say it but it smacks as the good old five year plans of Soviet era. But times are different and Russia is not the Soviet Union. Counting on BRICS and other similarly inclined countries is probably a delusion. Russia’s economic dependence on the willingness of huge regional emerging powers will cost it immensely. More worrying is the risk of bleeding more talent and technical elites. An illiberal economy even if it returns to a credible growth (now is in recession) cannot create a thriving intellectual and technical community without a driving ideology. Unlike international socialism, Russian orthodoxy and national traditions are a pretty lousy incentive for the truly creative class. Especially in closing in multinational and multi-religion federation while the rest of the world best more globalised. This is not the Cold War. It is a one sided, self imposed, belligerent stance that if anything shows the limits of current Russian policymaking and economic reform in a cleptocratic and idiosyncratic personal regime. This crisis was caused by mistakes made by both Russian and Western leaders and policymakers but the choice is ultimately Russia’s. In turn, this divorce will be costly for Europe too. It will pay not as much for its current stance against Russian belligerence and interference in Ucraine, blatant breach of international law and sovereignty of a nation but for its mercantile indifference to Russia’s despair in the 90s and its slide into an increasingly illiberal and corrupt regime more recently. However, if it serves as a mechanism increasing EU coherence and consistence of its foreign, economic and social policies it will be just the boost it needs at a time of constitutional and political crisis. Ultimately its entire trade with Russia, while representing a considerable amount, is but a tiny sliver of its GDP. For drawing the right lessons and making the right steps Europe needs to say stop to the pragmatic populists that dominate the center left and right for the past decade. Europe needs to return to real, policy and values driven politicians that can discuss issues like immigration, EU reform, fairness of the new European economic model in adult terms. Equally, this crisis will provide a real incentive for NATO to be serious about reform and member states about their defence spending and future defense integration. In fact this may be just the turning point for an emerging global power Europe. A power that is equally aware of the immense responsibility it has as a successful normative space , the force of its values but also the cost of stability and security in a world where history does not stop just because the West “won” the Cold War. AT
Russia’s New National Strategy
22 Friday Aug 2014
Posted in Europe, Foreign Policy, Journalism, National Interest, NATO, Politics, Russia, USA
Cafe Diplomatique 
There is nothing new or surprising in the “new” Russian National Strategy.
The Russians have been saying since the Nineties, that NATO expansion towards Georgia and Ukraine will result in conflict and war. They have been crystal clear in communicating this. If anything, they have been extremely predictable.
Even George Kennan, in an extremely prescient interview in the late Nineties, predicted the current crisis, with an amazing degree of accuracy.
One wonders why we’ve ignored their posturing to such an extent?
You go to some lengths to defend the idea that Russia isn’t threatened by such western expansion – precisely, I suspect, because it needs defending. But the fact is that Russia feels so – and that is enough. Like any other country, it has the right to determine itself what threatens it and what doesn’t. Moreover, we’ve obviously failed to assuage their fears, on the contrary!
I am also at some pain to understand how all this can be seen as having been “self imposed” and “self inflicted,” when the “isolation” in the form of sanctions and relentless media salvos has come from the West?
You also spend much time diminishing Russia’s current strength and future prospects. You somehow think it cannot afford the long standing policy choices it has made. Besides the fact that I disagree with the analysis (and recent history strongly leans in my direction), it doesn’t matter whether in the long run, it will be able to afford these choices. The real question is whether the deaths of many thousands and the misery of millions more, is worth, what is ultimately a proxy confrontation between the US and Russia? If you really had the interest of the average Ukrainian at heart, surely you would have advocated a different approach!
Lastly, it remains to be seen how Russia will fare out of this crisis – dancing with the dragon will not be easy. But certainly, Europe has lost, because without Russia, it will be weaker and less relevant. And because with Russia, China will be stronger and less easier to contain.