“Why Europe will live to fight another day – a view from its periphery”

When George Papandreou proposed a referendum in Greece on the austerity package, an attempt was made to give Europe back its connection to the people. It was morally right but strategically and tactically flawed. It promptly brought the demise of the Papapandreou government in Greece. He should be praised for his calm and persistent approach that, in the face of mounting unpopularity in the past year, allowed his country to avoid a plunge into unpredictable depth and even direr suffering. So should be the Spanish Socialists, utterly defeated in today’s elections. Punished is probably a better term describing the fifteen-percentage points difference between Rubalcaba’s PSOE and Rajoy’s PP. All governments in the countries most hit by recession and instability, from Ireland and Greece to Italy and Spain, will have new governments by next week.

The Eurozone core countries are not immune either. The future is uncertain for both president Sarkozy and chancellor Merkel as they find themselves on equally shaky ground. 2012 will probably bring more uncertainty and new rearrangements following (or not) elections. However, more fundamental questions need addressing in Europe if it is to fight another day. Just changing governments or operating choreographed reshuffles, bringing in various technocrats as was the case with the “bankers’ government” headed by Mario Monti in Rome, will certainly not suffice.

There are arguments on the side of European leaders that pushed for an about-face on the Greek referendum. Mario Monti is arguably an improvement, in every sense of the term, over the quirky ex premier Berlusconi. Except a short-term, but still dangerous, exception from democratic rule. Monti’s cabinet may be popular inside and outside the Parliament but it is certainly unelected.

Economic and market stability imperative are paramount today. However, this should not be an argument for an abut-face on the profoundly democratic nature and accepted vision of United Europe. There is a moral imperative to listen to Europe’s citizens. Equally there is the need for a renewed vision, one to guide them away from populist excesses and nationalistic retrenchments.

This is a view shared by many in Europe’s periphery. While Romania is not in the Euro-zone and was spared many of the immediate effects of the Euro crisis, like the rest of Europe’s periphery, we feel its knock-on effects. In the event of a full-blown default in the region, we would feel it without any safety barrier. Despite apparent better macroeconomic indicators, last week, the Ministry of Finance registered a major blow through its failure to launch a government bonds issue at a decent rate.

The European periphery is in equal turmoil. For many this term has come to be derogative, associated with higher risk and lower standards. This is also a frontier where perspectives are different and the urgency of keeping the fort together more evident. For all our flaws and shortcomings, this periphery has kept some edge to Europe’s industrial engine. We have fueled growth via markets and also contributed to Europe’s competitiveness via lower costs and valuable skills. In return, the periphery got a fighting chance for prosperity and access to values the average European finds anodyne.

We are not perfect, and we can create havoc in the machine. Still, when it comes to crisis we can endure. But we also see the limits of the club we joined. We worry to have joined the party when the merrymakers wake up with a hangover. In our less sheltered neighborhood we put a premium on Europe’s values, and primacy as a barrier against discretionary and ham handed approaches. We also value the special connection Europe and the US enjoyed.

The crisis is sapping EU’s political and economic energy. European Council after European Council important items are pushed aside as Europe focuses on its existential battle with unsustainable sovereign debts. Other frameworks for global decision with crisis management competences are also getting bogged down. The almost exclusive focus on Greece at the G20 meeting in France is a conspicuous example. There is an increased sentiment we are failing global agendas. All while Europe is dissolving in its economic quagmire and the US in its own partisan paralysis. On the periphery this is keenly and apprehensively felt. It is frankly not that our voce is diminished in the roar of the markets, but that parochial priorities are keeping but a handful of contributors in the debate.

The Greek crisis is a dangerous smokescreen that allowed bigger problems to fester and grow into insurmountable mountains, effectively doomed policies, and a diminishing international profile for Europe. At the edge of the periphery we have a lot vested in this profile. We depend on it as we depend on Europe’s investment.

The current situation is one markets abhor and citizens equally dislike. The retrenchment is manifest in the simple and clear statements that have come to prevail in the media and political discourse. It is understandable why so many German citizens polled in the past few days want Greece out of the European Union. It is less understandable to hear politicians that say that the Euro zone crisis is the inevitable unraveling of the EU. This is why it was a great news hearing Junker, the head of the Eurozone ministers, speaking in very clear terms about the lies and populist half truth that dominate the debate in Germany. This is part of the solution. Shattering the misplaced illusion that somehow the problem rests with the lazy south and problematic periphery is essential.

The fundamental flaws in European Union’s design were not addressed via enlargement. Partly because of a misuse of direct democracy in referenda, we failed to equip the EU with adequate instruments. We sacrificed the original constitutional treaty and replaced it with the contorted Lisbon Treaty. We have neither an efficient Commission nor an effective mechanism for balancing between the democratic requirements of an enlarged and diverse Europe and its gapping productivity divides.

The democratic deficit was tolerated while Europe was growing but it has become an incontrollable spiral in the midst of crisis. Markets and their demons, quite content with the results of EU enlargement and Germany backed stability in the boon years, are demanding higher return for their risk. The levels of uncertainty are pushing sovereign borrowing rates so high on the financial markets that they are simply not sustainable. Italy, Spain and even France are feeling the acute pressure. The latest victim, Hungary had to go back to IMF. Only its comparatively small size allows for that. There is a growing chasm between what markets expect and what politicians can deliver.

The responses available at national level are even contributing to the spiral. Austerity measures meant to address budgetary deficit are eating away at domestic consumption and growth and are paralyzing domestic lending markets.

Lacking a true European wide polity, with divided audiences and voters, politicians are too often driven by local and immediate perspectives. With elections taking place in several of the major Euro zone economies the prospects are not rosy. The combination of flawed institutional makeup, hyper reactive markets and captive politicians is toxic for the current needs of Europe and may be deadly for its ambitious original vocation.

The retrenchment around a core set of decision makers in Europe is neither democratic nor is it effective. There is always a natural tension linking the core and the periphery of a system. The risk of centrifugal destructive process has never been greater in the European Union. A Europe with multiple cores may well emerge form this mismanaged crisis. A fabled Europe a la carte, a pick and chose model, where the UK would be in the driving seat of a skeleton political structure with limited impact and Germany would reigning over a core of northern economies acting like a de facto fiscal union. This would certainly be the end of the ambition for Europe to be a net global contributor.

Europe’s southern periphery, with Greece, Italy and Spain, remains for now at the pinnacle of the Euro sustainability debate. But the periphery is by no means the essence of the crisis. The periphery has come to be equated with profligate spending, cavalier attitude to budgetary transparency and overall lacking in good economic governance. But more importantly, it came to represent the limitation of both the monetary mechanism for the Euro and economic governance in Europe. Structural problems are not limited to Greece or Italy and many are exacerbated by the very way the EU (and its ECB) operates.

These disequilibria had functioned as competitiveness drivers for the EU wide manufacturing sector and they are part and parcel of the German export success. All Audi engines are today produced in Hungary. Volkswagen and Skoda both export to China among other places and their production relies on the ultra competitive workforce of Spain, Hungary, Czech republic and Poland. Romania is a hub for the automotive industries with over 800 companies mostly based on investment from the Euro zone producing in the country. Equally well represented with tens of thousands of employees is the IT sector.

The countries on Europe’s periphery are at the receiving end and at the mercy of the markets. Some but not all, have seen their borrowing rates drop but investors and business are weary and petulant over the significant contagion risks if the Euro zone collapses. Already rates are evolving unpredictably for most countries except Poland. With the crisis raging, they see investments stop and growth rates diminishing. Employment is raising and their vulnerable social systems are brought to their knees.  They see not just mounting foreign debt with unsustainable rates, but also an austerity driven, downwards spiral of the quality of life. The population and communities in Europe’s periphery have neither the provisions nor the social nets to support them. They need a strong Europe not just to finance their growth but also to create long-term reason for investing in the periphery. The Commission was in normal times providing effective tough love but also served as conveyor of the periphery’s interests. Nowadays with the voice of the Commission diminished and the circle of trust reduced to single digits in the Council they are feeling isolated.

Europe cannot spend its way out of this crisis but it certainly cannot wear it out by austerity only. Balancing budgets is a good idea in general but austerity in face of the current crisis is not the proper response. The consumption shrink caused by the economic slowdown is compounded by the one-sided austerity policies that were the knee-jerk reaction by many governments.

The put back the trust in the Euro zone and European economies we need to be bold. A clear plan by the European Council, Euro zone ministers and ECB shall address these fundamental discrepancies on the longer term and not just roll-on the risk for next year. A clear plan and inclusive decision-making would go a long way to appease the markets and give a basis for good national governance and return to investment. This requires a strong and effective Commission and a functional European Stability Mechanism that includes both current and future Euro zone member states. Decision-making should be as collective as the burden sharing is. I do not believe the citizens of Europe are prepared to give up on the European Union as a joint political and economic vision and a harbor for prosperity and justice.

Without a fiscal union, current predicaments of the EU need to be addressed with more courageous risk managing provisions or significant redistributive policies at the scale of Europe. As the latter are almost impossible to achieve today, the focus should be on the former. The EU can use the European Stability Mechanism as the basis for a flexible but transparent and effective way to mange investment and credit risk across the EU. This would allow the markets to rally around a credible plan not just to shore those with a credit risk but for longer-term aggregate European growth.

The signs are turning. I am not saying it because of changing and more responsible popular sentiment or because of a bunch of technocrats entering the first line of decisions. Rather because we have hit a sort of rock bottom. When France and Spain have to borrow at close to 7 things need addressing. The ECB and Draghi are already changing cap on the direct lending topic. It will be messy and it is critically important that all states are part of the solutions. The letter by 13 member states on the new financial perspective is a good sign the periphery is getting organized. Even Lord Heseltine the former British PM believes the joint French German determination and interest will save the Euro and thus Europe from a catastrophe.

We have a European Council upcoming in December. This vision should be on the top of the agenda. If current governments do not do it credibly, the citizens will eventually elect those that will. And, on the periphery, time is running out. Andrei Tarnea

Social Pedagogy – a weapon: GLOC

Acum cateva zile, la Gala Premiilor Participarii Civice , organizata annual de CeRe, am transmis premiul unei organizatii neguvernamentale din Cluj. Juriul din care am facut parte a avut de ales dintre mai bine de 50 de proiecte. Unul dintre castigatori a fost Grupul de Lucru al Organizatiilor Civice .

GLOC: Suna ca o arma! Si sunt convins ca nu e intamplator. Cu toate ca imi repugna violenta cred ca numele se potriveste. Violenta suprema intr-o societate moderna este mizeria si saracia cauzate, sau perpetuate, de indiferenta si discriminare. Iar discriminarea facuta de autoritati publice este o violenta de stat!

Cand aceasta violenta este facuta cu stiinta si implica copii este probabil echivalentul unei crime de razboi. Ar trebui sa existe legi impotriva acestui lucru. De fapt ele exista. Sunt inscrise in Constitutie, in legi legate de locuire, educatie, afaceri sociale, administratie si in numeroasele acorduri si tratate internationale la care Romania este parte inclusive legislatie europeana. Si in baza acestora si a revoltei in fata indiferentei GLOC s-au constituit intr-o miscare militanta.

Pentru ca nu se poate combate violenta fara o arma. GLOC  este o arma in acest razboi. Si GLOC e arma impotriva indiferentei nationale. O arma impotriva resemnarii.

Povestea proiectului lor se invarte in jurul unei comunitati de clujeni, in majoritate de etnie Roma, adulti si copii. Acestia au fost mutati, prin decizie administrativa si in toiul iernii, din casele lor pe groapa de gunoi de la “Pata Rat”. Numele acesta cu o rezonanta la fel de sinsitra ca indiferenta cinica si ilegala a autoritatilor era practice necunoscut bunilor cetateni ai Clujului pana la aparitia acestui caz. Numai ca victimele fiind Romi nimeni nu parea foarte vexat de situatie. Pana au intervenit cei de la GLOC.

Dincolo de distanta de oras au intervenit si distrugerea retelelor sociale din comunitate si prabusirea nivelului de viata, care nu era de invidiat nici in circumstantele lor anterioare unul decent. Copii suferea cel mia atre de dificultatile acestea si practice noile circumstante fac dificil sau imposibil accesul lor la scoala. Cumultat cu cresterea violentei si abuzurilor din cadrul comunitatii de cca 70 de familii, viitorul acestor copii este la fel de sumbru precum este peisajul dezolant al gropii de gunoi.

Lipsa de reactie a cetatenilor Clujului e tragica. Un oras vechi, un oras universitar si un un centru religios si cultural al Transilvaniei, este ultimul loc pe care il vezi afectat de aceasta distrugatoare indiferenta.

Regretatul Tony Judt, in ultima sa carte “Ill fares the Land” spunea ca pretul unei societati divizate este indiferenta la cele mai acute suferinte. O societate in care diferenta intre venituri explodeaza nu este, si nu pate sa fie o societate solidara. Si in Romania acest lucru este evident. Dupa 10 ani de crestere economica, majoritatea celor mai bogati romani si celor mai mari companii romanesti si straine din Romania au o situatie financiara care indica cresterei massive si profituri grase. In schimb clasa de mijloc este in disolutie sub efectul; cumulat al crizei economice si politicilor strambe ce se bazeaza exclsuiv pe masuri de asuteritate pentru a reface echilibrul cheltuielilor si veniturilor publice.

Masuram gradul de bunastare si coeziune sociala dupa cum traiesc cei mai saraci si nu cei mai bogati membri ai unei societati. In Romania de azi secolul XXI si evul mediu coexista. Saracia in forme absolute adesea legata de discriminare istorica este ubicua. Fie ca vorbim de comunitati sarace de romi fie ca e vorba de comunitati rurale lasate prada indiferentei Romania de astazi este o tara in care saracia e o cauza majora a sub-dezvoltarii. Si este inacceptabil.

Cercul vicios al saraciei si subdezvoltari cronice nu este usor distrus de insule de crestere. In pofida cresterii PIB-ului an de an, si indicele Gini al Romanei este in crestere constanta cu implicatii nu doar pentru invinsi dar si pentru castigatori. Saracia ne costa pe toti. Iar mizeria unora este de fapt mizeria noastra a tuturor.

Nu faptul ca cei bogati sunt tot mai bogati este problema ci ca cei mai saraci raman pe loc sau se adancesc in saracie, adesea fiind supusi abuzurilor administrative in numele dezvoltarii. Sunt impinsi la margine, evacuati, ascunsi si aruncati. Numai ca saracia nu poate sa fie ascunsa. Si atunci cand masuri administrative o fac invizibila ea face efecte. De la lispa educatiei si calitatea deteriorata a fortei de munca, la lipsa eficientei programelor comuniatre, la lipsa coeziunii toate isi gasesc explicatii in deruta culturala si morala a mizeriei.

OECD a publicat anul acesta un raport detaliat privind corelarea intre perspectivele de dezvoltare economica si inegalitatile structurale de rezultat dintr-o economie. Saracia profunda si mizeria cronica adusa de aceste diviziuni este un lest pentru crestere.

Pe rand, cu mijloace diferite China, India, Brazilia sau Mexic dovedesc ca se poate obtine crestere economica durabila si semnificativa doar daca se combate saracia absoluta. SUA astazi platesc un pret semnificativ in stagnare de crestere si angajare in parte din cauza imenselor sale fracturi la nivelul veniturilor. O societate atat de divizata nu mai este o societate ci mai multe societati. Reich, Krugman si alti economisti scriu saptamanal despre efectele acestor inegalitati funciare pe care Tony Judt le deplange de pe o postura etica, sociala si politica.

Iar noi in Romania suntem o natiune tot mai divizata. Si iata ca devenim o natiune tot mai indiferenta.

Nu este de loc intamplator nici ca in centrul indiferentei de la Cluj se afla o serie de familii de Romi. Acesta este testul de identitate al societatii romanesti. Cum tratam aceasta comunitate si cum ne asiguram ca aceasta nu este in continuare obiectul discriminarilor mici si mari, individuale si administrative, economice si sociale o sa ne defineasca profilul de tara. Sunt pregatit sa spun ca acesta are sa fie un indicator pentru succesul economic al Romaniei.

Pentru ca, atunci cand trimitem prin decizie administrativa copii la groapa de gunoi, indiferenta devine politica. Raul indiferentei administrative este impersonal cinic si ucigas. Este un rau absolut, un Kafkian.

Iar acest tip de politica a discriminarii, arbitrariului si indiferentei la mizerie si implicatii sociale este paguboasa. Ea nu poate sa fie o baza sustenabila de dezvoltare nici pentru un oras nici pentru o companie. Cu atat mai putin pentru o tara. Iar in Romania am ajus sa consideram aceste decizii discriminatorii ca fiind banale.

Poate sa para exagerat in Romania unde traim sub iluzia ascunderii adevarului impactului saraciei. Averi se pot constitui pe abuz, plantatiile si minele au nevoie de sclavi in lanturi sau astazi de sclavi voluntari ai mizeriei dar societati functionale si de success nu pot sa se constituie pe aceasta baza. Romania functioneaza ca o piata de forta de munca ieftina si valoare adaugata mica. Inchiderea fabricii Nokia de la Jucu, tot la Cluj, indica simbolic acest lucru. Productia de acolo reprezenta13% din exporturile Romaniei si doar 0.2% din PIB. Romania exporta munca si atat. Intreaga economie a Romaniei reflecta natura sa de piata saraca cu multi consumatori dornici de lucruri ieftine pentru ca sunt saraci. Modelul sau economic este constituit asa, companiile sale sunt o reflectie a acestui model.  Si poate e seminificativ ca Romii din Romania sunt ultima populatie eliberata din robie in Europa.

GLOC, mai multe organizati neguvernamentale si organizatori comunitari din Cluj au intuit insa implicatiile acestor politici la polul opus unei bune guvernari. Nu e intamplator ca intre ei sunt sociologi si pedagogi sociali, specialisti in programe comunitare si ca nucleul include mai multe nume familiare mediului de stiinte sociale si umane al Universitatii Babes-Bolyai. Nu este intamplator nici ca o comunitate de arte s-a alaturat proiectului.

Dupa parerea mea asistam la re-aparitia unor miscari care au disparut practic in Romania dupa 1938. Este o refacere a unei miscari progresiste (cu sau fara asumare ideologica sau politica) care-si propune o forma de activism social angajat. Atitudinea este fondatoare. Este un inceput care pare sa fie urmat independent de multe fenomene similare in Romania.

O coalitie de oameni apropiati mediului universitar si activisti civici au facut pe rand din Barcelona, din Madrid sau din Berlin locuri in care saracia nu este o piedica in calea demintatii existentiale. Locuri in care drepturile fundamentale sunt asigurate si pentru cei mai saraci, izolati si exclusi din motive economice, sociale sau medicale. Locuri in care administratie este participativa si asta nu se refera doar la alegeri. Nu cred ca este intamplator ca cei de la Critic Atac  si GAS s-au alaturat efortului fie in nume personal fie in activitati.

GLOC nu au reusit, inca, sa rezolve situatia de la Cluj. Numai ca simpla existenta si continuitate a efortului aduc o sansa de acces la deminitate pentru cei de la “Pata Rat”.

Lupta impotriva indiferentei abuzive, discriminarii si izolari sunt pentru Romania prioritare. Nu doar pentru ca drepturile celor care sufera sunt afectate ci pentru ca sansele noastre ale tuturor ca societate sunt puse la bataie.

Caritatea si mila, oricat de importante sunt, nu pot sa tina loc valorilor fundamentale ale unei societati bine inchegate. O societate divizata este una in care binele public este generic si selectiv. O societate in care bunurile publice, care constituie baza exersarii drepturilor fundamentale, sunt expropriate este o societate in disolutie.

GLOC propun o alternativa la aceasta disolutie. Iar alternativa este solidaritate, dialog, asumare si actiune directa.

Saracia nu se combate doar asa dar indiferenta si reflexul discriminarii da. Solutiile structurale sunt, pana la urma, evident economice dar singurul mod in care asumarea unui proiect de dezvoltare integrat poate sa apara la nivelul comunitatilor este angajat si civic.

Oportunitatile apar si sunt folosite doar atunci cand societatea este pregatita. Romania de astazi nu este pregatita pentru ca institutiile ei sunt prizoniere intereslor privatre iar comunitatile ei sunt inca amorfe. Dar sunt semne ca lucrurile sunt pe cale sa se schimbe. Am intentia sa dedic un spatiu semnificativ in blog acestor schimbari, ele sunt mai importante in Romania decat politica interna sau externa. Andrei Tarnea

A deeply agnostic ritual

DoR
TITLE A deeply agnostic ritual
Running as a source of balance and answers.

by Andrei Ţărnea
Illustration by David Stroe
Translation from Romanian: Oana Gavrila

I run in the evening, sometimes at night.
Often, during a long and brutal run, I wonder if I actually like it. I ask myself why I do it. I know very well why I started running. I just never expected it to become such a big part of who I am. Running long distances is a constant negotiation with pain, with routine, with laziness, with a schedule that includes far more pleasurable alternatives. It’s not unusual to finish a race with blood where wet cloth rubs against your skin or with blackened and inevitably broken nails where your shoes – no matter how well-fitting – rub against your toes thousands of times at 14 km/hour. Writer Haruki Murakami, himself a runner, puts it squarely: “Pain is inevitable, suffering is optional.”
And still, I run. I’ve been running regularly for nearly 10 years now. When I started, my dad had just survived a serious heart attack but his life had already gone to overtime. When my tests for cholesterol levels, which usually came out normal, revealed a chronic condition, it was serious enough to push the buttons of every nutritionist and doctor on the American campus where I was studying. I was confronted with a major choice: either take pills or take a risky and uncertain bet that entailed a complete lifestyle change. At that time, I smoked a pack and a half a day, I sat in front of a computer 12 hours a day, slept four or five hours a night, and the little time I had left was divided between going to the library, drawing up reports, and going to grad school parties. I was thin but totally out of shape. My diet was reasonable for a healthy 28 year-old, but not for me.
As a kid, I practiced sports. For years, I swam lap after lap in the pool with my polo team, coached by a guy who seemed untainted by communist Romania of the ‘80s. He looked like someone straight out of an American action movie and had an MZ motorcycle he sometimes let the guys borrow. I continued exercising all throughout high school but running, which I found boring and painful, was the most unfortunate of exercising routines. But ten years later, after finishing university in Bucharest, moving to Boston, thousands of packs of usually strong and filterless cigarettes, hours spent with girls in bars and coffee shops or with volunteers and advisers in campaign offices or co-workers on the halls of public institutions, my genes and lifestyle caught up with me.
I made a deal with my American doctor and nutritionist: no drugs, but a strict diet and daily exercise. There’s nothing special about this decision and still, I’m not quick to recommend it to anyone. In theory, there’s no better place to start exercising again than on a sports-obsessed and duly equipped American campus. For a few weeks, I oscillated between continuous, and largely imaginary, hunger and constant muscle pains. My muscles ached with cramps, my joints hurt, my lungs fought against every gasp of air I inhaled after a few stadium laps. And still, in just two months, I was as addicted to running as I had been to cigarettes. I had found my perfect drug.

***

Becoming a runner took me by surprise. The moment I put on my running shoes quickly became the most exciting moment of my day. (I know now how horribly ill-suited those shoes were.) Few people’s running is perfectly neutral dynamically. Modern life makes our legs adopt incorrect and imbalanced movements. That’s no tragedy as long as you have someone to tell you what kind of running shoes you need. I ran in light, neutral shoes, when in fact I needed more support and more control. My knees, shins, tendons, and ligaments were paying a serious price for each kilometer I ran. Fortunately, I was so out of shape that for a long time I wasn’t able to run the distance and at the speed that would put me in any serious danger. However, that did nothing to prevent the pain.
Three years after I started running, I returned to Europe, to Brussels, to work in diplomacy. That’s when I first ran competitively: a 20-km race I signed up for, I don’t know why. Maybe I was trying to shine some reason on my obsession with running or at least find some plausible excuse for investing in a pair of shoes that cost three times more than regular shoes. For the past eight years, I’ve been buying my gear from a store in Brussels, on Rue de Luxembourg, and not because this is another ritual but because they’re good at what they do. Even if I can order everything online, I always go back there because the employees there are professional runners. Ahead of any big race in Belgium, the store serves as a coaching center, a psychologist’s couch, a source for inspiration.
When you run, you document your progress so you can evolve. In Brussels, I became stricter with my data records. At first, I had a long printout on my wall with days, hours, kilometers. It had corrections in red and green about the schedule, exclamation points for delays, and notes for promising feats. (Tuesday, March 8, 8 km Parc de Cinquantenaire, average heart rate 135 per minute. Wednesday, March 9, Bois de la Cambre, 12 km at 80% of targeted speed, bad because I risk injury.) Then I transferred my table to my laptop and my PalmPilot, but the most important spot was in my office at the embassy, hidden behind the door. On days when work kept me tied to my chair, I’d often glance at the running table and the “20 KM of Brussels 2005” poster, which made me think of my pair of Brooks Adrenaline I had in my gym bag in the locker room.
Today I can analyze years of training sessions, competitions, and routes, all registered in the virtual memory of a Facebook application developed by a young American runner. Voomaxer is a diary of sweat, the chronicle of an obsession I still can’t fully explain. All I know is that it stopped being a medical requirement a long time ago, and has become a state of being, an expectation, and a lifestyle.

***

When I run, I record details: shadows on facades, a mother and her little girl holding a balloon, the recently trimmed tree that looks strange, as if it had just escaped torture. Routes are populated by a whole routine of people: the guy in the black spandex suit, who runs intensely, almost daily; the determined but disorderly girl; the old man who jogs slowly and persistently, four times a week; the girl with the long legs, in excellent shape, who keeps her elbows high. I come across runners everywhere in the world. We greet each other without knowing each other. We’re like a cult. Even so, it’s a solitary endeavor, it’s mine and it’s unique even if the repetitive nature of the movements and routes create a hypnotic rhythm and a dialectic of movement and breathing. While I run, I can talk to my dad, solve problems at the office, make plans with my wife Andra. It’s a deeply agnostic ritual. It’s my church. Which I suppose makes this text a sermon.
When I read Murakami’s book on running, a bunch of things made me jump out of my seat excited about all the coincidences. His favorite route in Boston is the same as mine. I don’t think I’ve ever come across him, although I was there at that time. You get close to a city when you run the length of it and I loved how Murakami described taking in the route: familiar faces, waiting for predictable sensations in one’s body at the different stages of a longer run, shadows that turn into seasons, and especially the weather. (I like to run before or after it rains.) In general, the routine of running does not rule out the element of surprise, but expects and glorifies it. I can’t help remembering a scene on a mountain plateau when, as I was running through tall bushes, some buzzing creatures – too big to pass for insects, yet too small to be birds – kept swooshing before my eyes. I thought they were some sort of giant bumblebees until two of them stopped mid-flight a few centimeters from me, following my movements like mini-helicopters and, for the first time in my life, I saw two perfect ash-gray hummingbirds which then disappeared in a flash.
When I go for a run in New York, I get out early in the morning right off 37th Street, where the heliport is. That’s the start of a running track that closely follows the coast of the island, goes underneath the Manhattan Bridge and the Brooklyn Bridge, through the hospital district, passes by tennis courts, the fish market, Chinatown, then swerves toward Tribeca and the Financial District, and past Battery Park. That’s where I stop, look at the water, at tourists, commuters, police officers with their gear-loaded belts, National Guard soldiers who still guard the ruins of the World Trade Center. Then I turn back – 18 km in total. In New York, every 100-meter strip is different. Asphalt covered sidewalk full of black sticky globs of gum, concrete, track, wooden footbridge, sometimes splashed by waves stirred by ships crossing the East River, out-of-date cement, tar ballast, clay, earth and grass, sidewalk, concrete again, filled with cryptic markings in fluorescent spray paint left by utility and communications companies, humongous and heavy flame-cut steel plates covering potholes and works, cracked bitumen, concrete slabs with NYC metallic inserts, manhole covers. You get to know where you are just by looking at the ground.
Back when I lived in the States, I used to run after classes, after going to the library, after work. Now my mornings are less busy and then, nothing cures jetlag like a morning run, especially at sunrise, 3,000 meters up in the Colorado Mountains. I know exactly how the run will go. I need five minutes to build up a steady pace. I pass by wooden and red-brick houses, a shingle-roofed Texaco gas station, a small supermarket, a drugstore, a tiny Masonic temple, the ice-staking rink, a few bed and breakfasts. I smell moss, wood – cedar tree, I think – and a tinge of dust, although the air is very clean. Ten minutes into the run my lungs are floundering, I no longer control the pace and I’m panting so hard and gasping for breath, feeling unable to get enough oxygen. I’m already feeling as dry as tinder. I’m running through the trees, on ideal ground, a mixture of wood chips, earth and sawdust. After 20 minutes, my breath sounds like a steam engine and I need to focus on breathing out and I break into some sort of harrowing yawn that gulps up the air that is now warmer, as the sun has risen above the peaks and is shedding light on the forest and the sprawling houses. A concrete bridge goes over a creek tumbling downhill and I stop for a second to look at the thousands of trembling aspens that give this place its name and that glaze the forest in silvery hues up to the red-gray rocks.
I stop after about one hour and a half, as the small town awakens. I’m dehydrated and my lips feel like tree bark. I stretch for about five minutes, go into the hotel and up the elevator. In 10 minutes, I’ve showered, changed and I’m back downstairs for breakfast. It’s not even 8 and I have the feeling I got so much done already and the day is perfect.
Maybe I like running in America so much because the smells, the textures, the colors, the sounds are familiar and make me feel younger. It’s been 10 years but all my senses tell me I’m the same. What have I been doing all these years? I’ve been running. Nothing around me has changed, so why should I have? It’s not nostalgia for a place but for who I was in that place so many years ago. I don’t regret anything in particular but running provides me with an alterative to answers I don’t otherwise have.

***

My work invariably makes me into a nomad. I have always lived with a ready packed suitcase. It’s a bit better now but my years of traveling are marked by routes throughout Europe. In Copenhagen, I put on my running shoes, go to the front desk and ask where people go jogging nearby and one hour later I’m back after a 10-12 km run through the neighborhood. Tivoli has four artificial lakes nearby, spread onto an area that forms a long rectangle. In Paris, there’s an “industrial” route, 10-15 km through the longest elevated park in Europe. The mixture of Hausmannian boulevards, 19th century buildings and ultra-contemporary architecture make it a very attractive route. In Berlin, I run on a route of about 10 km between Mitte and Prentzlauer Berg, passing by parks, lounges, galleries, vintage clothes shops, houses occupied illegally in the ’90s by squatting punks and anarchists, which are now pseudo-touristy sites for western kids. In London, the Kensington Gardens are right across from the Romanian Embassy. In Rome, there’s the Borghese Park. In Istanbul, there’s Gülhane when I’m a tourist and Macka when I’m there on business.
And of course, the Cinquantenaire Park in Brussels, with its perimeter of exactly 2,200 m, five laps – 11 km, 10 laps – 22 km, half a marathon. This is the starting point of my favorite race, 20 km of Brussels. I go online and see the results of each of the five editions I took part in, all at a difference of less than 10 minutes from one another, between one hour and 25 minutes and one hour and 35 minutes. As most long-distance runners, I discover my consistency and personal limits at once.
In Bucharest, there’s the treadmill.
Pretty much every time. I’ve recently moved back and I run three times a week, between 8 and 10, at the gym, after work, sometimes on weekends too. I try to take my running out in parks but I have too little time and it’s complicated. I’m lazy and it bothers me that there are no running tracks, that people don’t get out of the way, that there’s smoking and I run through clouds of cigarette smoke, that there’s dust, that dog owners act as if the sidewalk were a litter box, that there are cars parked on the sidewalk, and stray dogs are ready to shred your legs.
I run erratically and I see in my log how the distances are all messed up, schedules are never kept, and the pace is always high to try and make up for the lost distance. I’m not developing the harmonious curves of a regular season. They’re all crouched and crooked. There’s something of a survival attempt and struggle between instinct and reason. More and more people start running here and I am fully aware that I should make the effort to take it outside. Nothing is more maddening than systematically running long distances on a treadmill. You can only document them in abstractions: km, duration, heart rate. Running without a route is disengaging and dull.
As many runners, I have a small chest of material evidence of my voluntary suffering: race numbers, shoe tags to measure time, medals I got for taking part in races in several countries, maps of routes, old newspapers with pictures taken at races I was in, my first pair of New Balance, good for running but bad for me. I don’t put them on display, I don’t flaunt them, they’re not for other people to see.
However, as soon as I’m done with a workout, my app posts the distance and duration on Facebook. It’s a sort of public commitment. I’ve added 10 km, 6 km, 8 km, 25 km – I create expectations for myself and others. I make a race with an audience out of every run. This makes exercising socially significant, it gives it a symbolic value that can be shared. It’s my manifesto for a dynamic, independent approach, a rebuff of the paralysis and getting stuck halfway through, a state one often gets caught in in Romania.
There’s a quote by Aristotle on Voomaxer: “We are what we repeatedly do, therefore excellence is not an act, but a habit.”
Maybe that’s why I run. To avoid mock-excellence and to negotiate with myself all the compromises required by life, my age, my job, my location. I have only one chance to balance them all – the long run. Running is my own private way of appreciating the long run. In an age of immediate gratification, instant communication, and lack of decency, running is a deeply personal experience, unshared but not excessively selfish.
Each session is determined by what you’ve done in the previous one. I know there are many runners out there who want the routine of a single distance and of fixed time. Daily, at the same time, at the same pace, a sort of well-managed Zen. This is what satisfies them: the fact that nothing ever changes. Isn’t that what I’m looking for too? But when you have goals of time and distance you need to train on a curve and it’s a curve that widens in the long run. It’s still routine. You add kilometers as you subtract days. It’s a fair trade.
As I was saying, I’m not cut out to be a long-distance runner. That’s easily apparent here, where I find it hard to run. What I don’t have here is subtle confirmation: feeling like running in Bucharest as I do in other places where I have favorite routes. That goes for everything I do, not just running. My Bucharest is artificial. I want to claim it back without giving up on who I am. But for that I have to get off the treadmill. I don’t see why I wouldn’t succeed: persistence is a runner’s best quality. And I run because I’m persistent. I do it automatically, it’s a reflex, it’s habit. I put on my shoes and run, I don’t ask myself why I do it.

Andrei Ţărnea is a career diplomat. Today, he is the executive director of the Aspen Institute Romania. He lives in Bucharest with his wife Andra.

Why I as a non American stand with the 99%

Now we have three different camps of one pagers battling in the symbolic internet war: the original 99% arguing for a more generous, balanced and just society, the 53% and various variations essentially saying go study, work, do not get loans or mortgages and your life will be just fine. And then you have The 1% standing with the 99%

All are political positions but in fact only the last group can afford to be political. If the 1%’s stories are true they come packed it into a shrunk common good narrative that it is hard to dismiss. This is not gooey do-goodism. It is often expressed as a self interested effort to create a cohesive and balanced society. For the rest, it is not quite so simple. The option to just go work hard etc. should be normal and it is part of that “protestant ethic” that according to Weber built at least the spirit of capitalism. The problem is that the entire social model of the current market capitalism, and the state it has shaped, is designed for people and communities that are culturally induced to consume. The quality of ones life is perceived and judged via the quantity and sometimes quality (measured in item price) of his or her consumption of goods and services. Heck the value of a person is often measured in his or her net worth! That net worth measured by household and communities happens to be negative for the US now days. But even beyond lifestyle choices, there are fundamental quality of life issues at stake often hidden in statistics. Like how in the US the cost of healthcare is more than three times as much as in Japan for a worse quality and that is true for both private and public spending. In a market like that, built on artificial needs, the cost will go up and up. That means providers of those inflated value goods will make lots of money while those buying them will pay, well lots of money. If the mechanism of tax and redistribution, via social nets or good old employment and pay, is broken our world happens. I am simplifying but how many people really afford their houses, cars, i-phones and even frozen dinners? Not to mentions insurance, school etc.? One way to look at it is to say go be the guy or girl that works hard and achieves and then spends according to the modest means allowed by a mediocre education, leading to a mediocre job that may not even be there as it already migrated to China, India, or Latin America (what that implies is yet another different story). This happens when all manufacturing goes away and the services economy replacing it requires either low pay jobs or extremely high skill ones (and thus costly education). So what awaits you, all those working hard and living modest lives (with no debt burden), is no more glorious: a life o bad apartments, old cars, bad teeth and mediocre but more and more expensive medical care etc. Oh and overall crumbling public infrastructure. But you did this proudly and freely, alone with your own means. You accepted your faith and the rules of the game. Bravo! The thing is, out of the three classic major holders of wealth: households including small family owned business, states and corporations, the first two are bankrupt. Only corporations are doing better than ever in the modern history. This is where the concept of 99% fits. Whatever people write on a piece of paper, and whether they are willing to acknowledge this or not, most Americans are the 99%. The rest is personal ideology and it is entirely legitimate. That being said, I find both of these attitudes correct: standing up for the inequity and profound social injustice but also doing your part by assuming that you have decisions to make as well. Decisions may well be to accept the rules or to change those rules. Now if I am not pleased with what society has to offer and if I blame partly the dominant social powers here large corporations and a part of the political elite I can say that and act against it. Or just work hard and be content with your lot in life as they say. There is no implicit value in neither of the options. The outcome defines that value and only through your own perspective on your past choices (well your kid may have a say or two). I for one have a job, limited debt, and a decent quality of life after having benefited top tier American education that did not leave me with too much in academic loans. The truth is I worked hard throughout my studies in Romania and in the US. That is for money to support myself and extend my studies. It helped that I was (mostly) lucky to find work that meaningfully impacted my career and gave me options and I had the family background to do something with them. I know too well this is a luxury and that chance and other factors played their part. In particular my upbringing and family background in Europe even in communist and post com Eastern Europe. I am not foolish enough to believe this applies to all. While none of my family was remotely wealthy, I do feel like the guy in the picture posted below with his oil rich family. So despite my relative success under existing rules, I tend to be partial to those that say they feel abused and oppressed. This is why I as a non American stand with the 99%. I do believe people should have the same options I had. Is this political? Hardly, I personally think it is moral. And this applies to my own country and its current situation as much as to America. Andrei Tarnea

Difficult choices for Turkey’s political opposition

The ever complicated context of Turkish domestic politics and public opinion should never surprise observers. It never fails to offer new twists and turns. So is the recent US Turkish agreement on instaling a radar in Turkey that drew a bizarre alliance in a unprecedented protest of the fledgling opposition.

Now, in the middle of its renewed relationship with Iran and its historic low with Israel, Turkey’s leadership signs an agreement to host the US/NATO missile defense system destined to address some of the critical strategic threats in the region. An this is done by the fire and brimstone critic of US and western policies in the region, current PM and AKP leader Erdogan.

This is for many western commentators and observers a positive development in an otherwise murky context. Equaly positive is the news that the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is to speak at a key Turkish event this month.

The Turkish opposition, struggling under what many observers decry as a heavy handed use of state means against political enemies by the AKP, both before and after the recent elections, are steeping up against the US-Turkish deal. Nothing radical in a democracy. That is what the opposition is suppose to be doing after all: criticize government. And they are not mainly asking for the deal to be rescinded but for it to be made public and transparent. Requesting a greater say for the parliament they are primarily attempting to show the “double dealing” nature of the governing party. They are doing that together with the Kurdish party. Now THAT is something new and not entirely in the DNA of a CHP – a party with a history of nationalistic overtones. CHP are traditionally, if anything, a secularist force that was perceived as competent and pro US if captive to the venal and Byzantine clientele relationship linking big business and the military. Alienating the fast growing population of Turkey, CHP paid a great price in the last decade via diminishing control over business, media, public opinion and even Turkish elites. Their predicament is linked to the challenge brought about by the rise of a new political class dominated by an Anatolian base. The Islamic inspired AKP, appealed to this new and growing power base and successfully challenged the long domination of Western Turkey and Istanbul and CHP. Despite a systematic attempt to use the secular constitutions and the courts to keep the Islamic party out of power (or the political game altogether) ultimately AKP prevailed. Erdogan and his party just got a third mandate with an increased majority short of a “supermajority” required to change the Constitution without the need for a referendum. While CHP lost this year’s elections it did so while increasing for the first time in years its share. It took a while for CHP to find a new discourse. Recently, under Kemal Kilicdaroglu, it is emerging as a reasonable pro western force balancing between the ultra-nationalists and the ever-rising star of AKP. This is why the dialogue with Kurdish parties is also important. Even if joining in an “anti-imperialist” protest is probably not the best credential in Brussels or Washington this should not be read exclusively as an anti-Western and anti-NATO stance. While the requests for transparence and governmental accountability they presented are legitimate, the nature of the challenge remains unclear. Calling AKP’s bluff and its double standard vis-à-vis the US and its policies in the region may sound like a good thing for democracy in the region but it also smacks of another populist flavor. A return to the “radical left” is probably not the way ahead for Turkey’s opposition and neither is a nationalistic stance. The complex relationship between Turkeys government and the divided opposition is currently pushing a form of cooperation between CHP and the Kurdish forces. This is probably helped by PM Erdogan’s unwillingness to negotiate with the latter and his total contempt for the former. The evolution of CHP and more so the ebb and flow of Turkish US relationship is arguably an important element of Eastern Mediterranean stability. This is why issues related to Cyprus like this on Turkish gas exploration in Cyprus’s economic zone and this on EU’s stance on Cyprus and Turkeys qualms with that will continue to influence the overall Turkish foreign policy posture.

CAP has recently presented a series of in depth analysis of the evolutions that are worth exploring by anybody with an interest in Turkey and its region. Here CHP Future Turkey and here Turkey’s political developments

Andrei Tarnea

The Austerity Mantra

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austerity, crisis, debt, economic growth, economy, employment, jobs, labor, NYT, Paul Krugman, political discourse, politics

“Austerity is inflicting vast pain now, and killing our future, too.” says economics Nobel Prize laureate Paul Krugman in his NYT OpEd The Bleeding Cure. Yesterday on his blog he was justly complaining that on both sides of the Atlantic a “Very Serious” narrative is obfuscating the truth and systematically eluding facts about the economic situation. This is driven by both ideological sentiment and also a generation of particularly incompetent public leaders. The reason for this widespread incompetence is to be found in the way we are selecting, promoting and electing them. The systematic intellectual impoverishment of the majority of the mass media has led to public debates that use simplistic and populist topics as alternative to serious debate. This way, real competence, that is as much part of the public elites as it ever was, becomes irrelevant. We need to find a way to turn away from pseudo debates and look into the reality of the crisis. And it’s about time because this is as serious as it gets. Unfortunately, facts have been just a nuisance in the political discourse on the current economic crisis. From the beginning of the Euro/Debt crisis so many governments in the EU have been using this Very Serious narrative they dubbed the “failed social state” to create policies that are bound to make matters worse on the short term and terrible on the long term. The austerity mantra has come to replace any economic argument. Beyond Milton Friedman and ignoring Keynes, too many political leaders with powerful economic decisions and bully pulpits have effectively banned any discussion on alternative solutions. Choices undermining growth and recovery are coupled with dismantling unions and labor protection, reducing spending in education and social services directly impacting long-term competitiveness. This has taken ridiculous forms in former communist countries like Romania and Hungary. The leadership of both is engaged in a crusade against the “social state” and the new enemy of the people is the “socially assisted”. Of course this conveniently includes minorities like the Roma and social categories like the unemployed, and unemployable because of failures of the education system. It is this ideologically driven narrative that has vested interest in obscuring facts and treating reality like an imaginary construct. The logic of selective austerity coupled with low taxes for the rich and a wreaking of social nets is costing Romania dearly. The country already had some of the most abysmal levels of budgetary spending in the UE on public education, healthcare system and social services. That does not deter from a mix of ultra-liberal and populist fiction to be churned out daily by the minions of the government and subservient media. When armies of pensioners (in a country where life expectancy makes the vast majority of them into net contributors – 69 for men and 77 for women!) are what stands between a competitive economy and a failed economic policy you know something is deeply amiss with the narrative. It is time to replace this destructive and simplistic narrative and return to job creation and spending. This requires income to spend and it requires a careful mix of cutting unnecessary and often ineffective spending and replacing it with spending that has return in competitiveness improvement and economic growth. Unless we escape the anti-government and austerity only narrative we will be facing a downward spiral I terms of consumer and investors trust. Not a good thing for returning to sustained growth and meaningful employment. This is why jobs in the public sector are good. This applies to Greece, the US and Romania alike. Otherwise we will crumble under the 1 billion Euro a month extra debt we add without any visible short-term or demonstrable long-term impact on jobs, growth or productivity. Andrei Tarnea

The Other End of the Spectrum: Ideological Kinship Between New Foes

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Ayalon, Davutoglu, democracy, Erdogan, foreign policy, Gul, iliberal, Israel, liberal, Lieberman, nationalism, Netanyahu, Turkey, values

Israel and Turkey, Foes and Much Alike

“Both countries have gone from aggressively secular societies to populist ethno-religious states where standing up to foreigners offers rich political rewards.” … “Israel, whose Middle Eastern ties are fraying badly, looks to “new” Europe, countries like Poland but also to Romania and Bulgaria where anti-Turkish feelings run high from Ottoman days.” NYT

It appears the Eastern-European total disregard for the substance of democratic values in a liberal society is spreading successfully. This is for many a bizarre development. The general, if misplaced expectation, was that former communist countries would tend to have a strong tendency to support liberal-democratic values. On the contrary, former Soviet citizens in Israel and significant parts of the population in Eastern Europe embraced a bare bones democratic ideology with a populist flavor. This favors strong-men approaches and a discourse that uses both nationalistic and pseudo-democratic terminology to support ultimately illiberal outcomes. This was practiced with gusto by both left and right of center parties in Central and Eastern Europe and post Soviet states. The result is a total lack of appetite for the diversity of opinions, dialogue and partnership and ultimately for the negotiated and complex outcomes of a liberal society. In a twist of ideology, this profound disdain for liberal values mixed with a praise of the markets impacts foreign policy as much as the internal structure of these societies. In this context, Transatlanticism becomes a business and security issue void of meaningful values. This is a tendency that, for different reasons plagues all the west and is as much part of the US political development as Western Europe, Globalization of ideas makes this a self reinforcing process. Its victims are the set of liberal-democratic values that were the trademark for both conservative and progressive politics in the West as well as those societies substantially influenced by its thinking.

The NYT article quoted here follows the same developments in Israel and Turkey. In one case it was exactly this post-soviet mindset, brought by the huge influx of population from the Soviet Union. In Turkey it is the mix of rural and religious values and the counter-reaction to the crony system run for a century by the army and the westernized elites. No wonder Netanyahu bides his time for what he hopes will be a Republican administration in Washington and Erdogan shuns the EU while the Turkish Foreign Ministry threatens braking relations over Cyprus taking over the EU rotating presidency next year.

Foreign policy is considered the realm of realism and pragmatism and it is relatively rare to have ideology driven propositions having a serious impact in actual life. But when they do, it is usually a potent mix of driven personalities and major economic and strategic interests that run the show. This was very much the case with the neoconservative group influencing the foreign policy agenda of the Bush administration built around Dick Cheney, Condi Rice, Donald Rumsfeld and lesser extent Richard Perle. This is why the likes of Brent Scowcroft, while holding staunch Republican feelings, did not support their interventionist agenda. This is the case with Erdogan, Davutoglu and Gul, Netanyahu, Lieberman, Ayalon.

On the other hand, Obama’s administration foreign policy agenda appears far less imbued with ideology. In many ways the pragmatic approach promoted by President Obama, state secretary Clinton and defense secretary Gates (nobody expects secretary Panetta to change the tack) finds it difficult to adapt to this renewed ideological discourse expected more from Iran than from Turkey and Israel. If the New Partnership policy with the Muslim societies and the MENA policies of the US administration are to succeed, ideology fueled by religion, nationalism, local conflict will have to be figured in. Andrei Tarnea

Alea Jacta Est! Quid Prodest?

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Abbas, EU, Fatah, Fayyad, Hamas, Independence, Israel, Netanyahu, Obama, PA, Palestine, Security, Statehood, UN, UNGA, UNSC, USA, Vote

Ale Jacta Est! Quid Prodest?
Mahmoud Abbas decided that he has nothing to lose and he went for broke. The head of the PA knows that the approach to the UN will not pass the UNSC and the veto of the US. Equally he is aware he will not have a majority of EU states supporting the unilateral step. However, he believes his and Fatah’s positions – and electoral chances next year – are better served by what appears as a strong, principled and maximal position. Regardless of the result of a UNGA vote he appears as the staunch partisan and supporter of Palestinian interests. All while strongly emphasizing the importance of achieving independence via exclusively non-violent means. In contrast to Hamas, he positions himself and the PA as the democratic partner for peace and legitimate defender of the Palestinian cause. To some extent this is true and it is creating a huge pressure on both the Obama Administration and the Netanyahu government in Israel. However this may not further the chances for a functional Palestinian state. The speech and the request contained does not change the fact that the entire thing is a dead-end. Nothing will change on the ground and high and unrealistic expectations – partially fueled by the stance of the likes of Turkey’s PM Erdogan and the new Egyptian administration – will be soon quashed. Considering the fact that Hamas already distanced itself from the demarche, too aware that regardless of the outcome they suffer a PR setback, the chances for a unity Palestinian government are slimmer by the day. Even if we assume this is a correct moral position by the PA this is not a serious and responsible step towards a two state solution and lasting peace. The PA and Abbas, and with them West Bank prime minister Salam Fayyad, gain a symbolic victory but they may end up drawing the short straw when it comes to the cash-in of this entire saga. The other clear looser is Netanyahu. He is shown as the intransigent party incapable of creating the condition for compromise and fully responsible for the “last resort and not by choice unilateral” measure by the PA. Above all Palestinians and Israelis may end up being the bigger losers and with them also the citizens of some the region’s most undemocratic regimes. The context is flammable and tense. Extreme violence is not a remote possibility and many parties in the region believe an open conflict or serious crisis would solve their bigger domestic problems. The Palestinians may be right in their objective to establish a functional state but they are definitely not using the right means. The importance and failure of achieving a Palestinian unity is covered up by a huge smokescreen. But the smoke will raise soon enough and at the end of the day a new process needs to emerge replacing the stalemate and intrenched positions. For that reason maybe the entire debacle is not without merits.
Andrei Tarnea

September

September

September 11, 2011

When I have first returned, years latter, I felt the loss by just looking at the skyline. And I feel it every time I happen to see it be it in a movie, a photograph, or real life. I feel like many others that while I was never a New Yorker the city is mine as well.

I was in NY on September 10. That evening I returned to Boston where I was in graduate school. Next day, at about the same time the highjackers were boarding their planes a few miles away at Logan Airport, I was listening to music and working on my computer on the back porch of my apartment. When the phone rung and my girlfriend told me about the first plane I was convinced it is a docu-fiction airing on TV. Little did I know what was coming. For the next hours, days and weeks I lived in the rhythm of the events. My five hours per week research assistantship in crisis management for a Fletcher School professor at the Security Studies Department turned into an almost full time job. I am convinced the attacks played an important part in my decision to return to Romania and continue my work at the MFA. Ever since in one way or another my work and my life is shaped by that choice.

I went back to NY a few weeks later and the smell of the city then haunts me to this day. In many ways I was in the ideal place to try to make sense of what was happening and what was to come. As student at a top graduate school for international relations, I was blessed with professors and colleagues sharing my questions and attempts for answers. This made it somehow more bearable despite the utter dismay, pain and shock we all felt. Due to the presence of several American colleagues that were on active or reserve military duty I felt the tension of preparations. I had several American colleagues that disappeared from class in the days and weeks following the attack. We all knew. We had a group of serving diplomats from around the world and the legal and practical implications were considered at length. Due to the presence of several Afghan colleagues I was familiar with the territory and the reality of the country. I had met just a few weeks prior Abdulah Abdulah, the US trained doctor serving as the Northern Alliance’s spokesperson and foreign representative. Also, several of my friends at school were Muslim Americans, Pakistanis or from Kashmir. For all those reasons I had an apprehension about the things to come. Afghanistan was to be quickly followed by Iraq. And the narrative of freedom and defending the Western world from terrorism turned into the dour reality of the ongoing “war on terror”. Camps, renditions, torture, death, suicide attacks and civilian victims are the daily litany of horrors.

Eric Hobsbawm had made famous the concept of his short century, condensed between 1914 and 1991. He was talking about its indelible marks: World War I, Wall Street Crash, World War II, Holocaust, Atomic War, Cold War, Fall of the Berlin Wall and Communism. So much barbarism, violence and irrational hatred condensed in that brief century. It appears to me the morning of September 11 had all the same characteristics for the current century. Was this to be the mark of yet another short century? Two wars later it certainly appears so. The economic crisis on 2007 and the current global recession make things even more complicated as witnessed by the sovereign debt and deficit debates shared on both side of the Atlantic. However, I believe and I hope we will stop short of the calamitous and suicidal errors of the previous century. The new ideologies however manic and criminal they are they also lack the stamina and murderous coherence involving states. Maybe, just maybe, we have learned enough from our past mistakes to avoid the worse despite making daily mistakes and horrible policy choices. How we mange the events in Syria, the ongoing crisis in Israel and Palestine, Iran, Turkey’s growing role and increasing dis-alignment with the West, all will come to define this, our Century.

At the Aspen Ideas Festival this summer, Thomas Friedman said he was disappointed that while the cold war made the world put a man on the moon the war on terror led to better body scanners. That is in his opinion the gap of achievement or the failure of using the opportunity of this terrible crisis for the Western world. It remains to be seen. In many ways this is why I was saddened by the Ground Zero mosque controversy and the lack of ability to seize on an opportunity to bridge the divide. If president Obama’s vision for a New Beginning is to come true, in a few decades, we may look at this with a different view. With the Arab revolutions in full swing one needs to look at the future with some hope. The challenges of the present are impossibly complex and the outcome of the transformation is far from unwaveringly positive. With the capture and death of Osama bin Laden we are entering a new phase. This is one is of attrition, as Al Qaida is waning and its capacity to mount serious operations diminishes the probability of another large-scale attack is gone. This is the end result for which a huge human cost was paid in the last decade. The number of threats is however increasing and the homegrown terrorism and self-radicalized youth are a yet to be a fully understood threat. This is why the effort to address civilization and cultural divides is equally important. Attacks in the US and Europe by both islamists and radical right show that irrational hatred continues to be a fundamental threat to our values. We have to address these challenges spanning inside and outside the geography of the West. I am convinced, if the values of freedom and of humanism we inherited from the enlightenment are to prevail, they will do so only together.

I used to do my long runs around the southern tip of Manhattan. The first time I did so upon returning to America the towers were no longer there. I still do it every time I visit NY and often I stop at Battery Park and look back at where they should be. These days construction crews are busy building and this is a sign of resilience and maybe of healing. I also think about those that perished then and in the past decade. May they rest in peace and their memory be preserved.

This is dedicated to the memory of Ben Sklaver

Andrei Tarnea

O vară bizantină între primăvara arabă şi toamna palestiniană

Sfarsit de Vara in Levant

În câteva zile, Autoritatea Palestiniană va cere Adunării Generale a Naţiunilor Unite recunoaşterea unei Palestine independente pe baza frontierelor dinainte de 1967 cu capitala în Ierusalimul de Est şi acceptarea ca membru cu drepturi depline al ONU. Simultan expiră termenul stabilit simbolic de preşedintele SUA, Barak Obama, pentru un acord de pace israelo-palestinian. În regiune şi de amble părţi ale Atlanticului se aud voci care prevestesc catastrofe. Asistăm la o oportunitate ascunsă într-un eşec.

Procesul de negocieri de pace în Orientul Apropiat este o lungă serie de eşecuri punctate de paşi înainte adesea înşelători. Cel mai bun exemplu sunt acordurile de la Oslo, pentru mulţi o falsă soluţie. Astăzi criticate, ele apar ca un fund de sac care a blocat o soluţie stabilă, durabilă şi mai ales paşnică. Pentru alţii, ele rămân cheia de boltă a securităţii şi începutul soluţiei. Prea multe oportunităţi au fost pierdute, atât în teren de cele două părţi, cât şi de comunitatea internaţională, inclusiv de SUA şi UE. Momentul actual este diferit prin scară şi implicaţii. Există un val favorabil şi un context în care obiective foarte ambiţioase pot să fie realizate.

Dinamica diplomatică actuală nu indică însă aceste ambiţii. Obiectivul comun nu este doar un stat Palestinian, ci pacea durabilă. Reluarea negocierilor pentru două state care să convieţuiască paşnic, pornind de la frontierele din 1967 cu schimb de teritorii şi ţinând cont de evoluţiile din teren este singura cale de a evita cele mai sumbre temeri ale tuturor taberelor. Folosind momentul din septembrie se pot alinia condiţiile unui nou set de negocieri. Pentru aceasta, poziţiile nu trebuie să se alinieze îngust doar pe diviziunea pro şi contra unei rezoluţii a AGNU. În acest sens, articolul pleacă de la contextul actual, considerând opţiuni şi implicaţii pentru după septembrie şi ce înseamnă acestea pentru Vest, UE şi România.

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Pentru început, AP susţine că demersul său la ONU este singura soluţie în faţa eşecului negocierilor pentru care acuză Israelul şi SUA şi în mod specific politica colonizărilor israeliene în Cisiordania. Riyad Mansour, reprezentantul Palestinian la ONU, afirmă că “recunoaşterea statului palestinian independent ar reprezenta o investiţie în pace”. În luna mai, demersul a obţinut susţinerea Ligii Arabe. Pe de altă parte, politicieni israelieni şi mai ales ministrul de externe Avigdor Lieberman, au anunţat că se aşteaptă ca, indiferent de ce decizie se ia la ONU în NY, cererea AP la ONU să fie însoţită de mişcări de stradă şi de o deteriorare gravă a securităţii. Unii comentatori se referă la un val de zeci de mii de protestatari şi chiar la posibilitatea unei a treia intifade. Pentru comentatori citaţi de Haaretz şi New York Times, reacţiile autorităţilor israeliene sunt o strategie care să prelungească status qvo-ul, folosind justificarea unilateralismului palestinian.

SUA au reacţionat indicând suspendarea ajutorului financiar pentru Cisiordania în cazul adoptării soluţiei unilaterale. Totodată, prin vocea ambasadorului Susan Rice, au avertizat că un vot favorabil ar duce foarte probabil la punerea în discuţie a susţinerii în Congres a finanţării de către SUA a ONU. Restul “cvartetului” a apărut mai discret. Ca reacţie la poziţiile americane, preşedintele Abbas a semnalat că AP ar putea să prefere o formulă intermediară cu un statut de “non-membru al ONU”. În ce o priveşte, Uniunea Europeană a înregistrat în iulie un nou eşec în încercarea de a evita un vot prin reluarea negocierilor. AP se aşteaptă la voturi favorabile din partea unui număr de membri ai UE, dacă se ajunge la un vot în AGNU. Având în vedere posibilitatea SUA de a uza de dreptul său de veto, atât pentru o rezoluţie a Consilului de Securitate, cât şi pentru o recomandare a CS către Adunarea Generală a Naţiunilor Unite, nu se ştie încă ce formulă va prevala. Pentru palestinieni, ridicarea subiectului este o prioritate care să aducă o victorie simbolică în AG. AP contează pe un vot favorabil şi o majoritate de două treimi în formula consacrată în timpul războiului rece, “uniting for peace resolution”. De partea sa, Israel îşi doreşte o victorie morală printr-un vot contrar al cel puţin 60 de state în AG ONU.

Care este însă miza şi contextul în care se întâmplă acest vot? Există voci care susţin că, din punct de vedere legal, miza este uriaşă: statutul de apartenenţă la ONU asigură aplicabilitatea drepturilor ce decurg din Carta Naţiunilor Unite, în mod special cele legate de apărarea integrităţii teritoriale. Este evident că aceste implicaţii depăşesc cu mult valoarea simbolică. Spectrul acestui demers bântuie problematica Orientului Apropiat de mulţi ani de zile. Contextul actual este marcat de patru dimensiuni: blocarea negocierilor de pace, fractura internă a societăţii palestiniene, ansamblul schimbărilor politice şi securitare aduse de revoluţiile arabe şi nu în ultimul rând, politica administraţiei preşedintelui Obama.

Pe fondul eşecului acordurilor de la Oslo şi a medierii cvartetului, AP are o poziţie subiectiv întărită de evoluţiile favorabile interne, interesele regionale ale administraţiei SUA şi de schimbările din regiune. Însă pentru AP, acest demers nu are doar o dimensiune strategică, ci şi una politică.

Urmează alegeri prezidenţiale şi parlamentare în Palestina, în contextul în care ultimul scrutin a lăsat răni adânci în societate. Conflictul dintre Fatah şi AP pe de o parte şi Hamas pe de alta a dus la divizarea de facto a Palestinei. Se ridică întrebarea legitimă – cine vorbeşte pentru cine, şi deci cine cere de fapt recunoaşterea independenţei Palestinei la ONU? Şi în acest context, ce se întâmplă cu Gaza? Vocea recunoscută oficial internaţional este cea a AP, chiar dacă circumstanţele fac ca mandatul preşedintelui Abbas să fi expirat din 2009. Hamas este în continuare tratată drept organizaţie teroristă de către SUA şi UE.

Acordul dintre cele doua facţiuni, mediat de Egipt în primăvară, pare să aducă, în parte sub presiunea străzii palestiniene, doar o apropiere formală. Dublul eşec, împărtăşit de AP şi cvartet, al negocierilor cu Israel şi al opririi procesul de colonizare, a lăsat foarte puţin loc de manevră, iar acordul cu Hamas reflectă acest lucru. Acest acord ridică însă la fel de multe probleme precum rezolvă. Dacă o Palestina unită este necesară pentru o soluţie de pace stabilă, dar şi pentru votul din faţa ONU, Hamas nu a renunţat nici la lupta armată şi nici la obiectivul “distrugerii Israelului”. Acest aspect face negocierile directe imposibile. Hudna, conceptul clasic islamic al armistiţiului propus de Hamas, nu implică renunţarea la violenţă decât temporar, nu presupune recunoaşterea Israelului şi a acordurilor în vigoare. La rândul său, leadership-ul Hamas nu pare convins că acordul îi serveşte interesele, dar nu are la rândul său de ales. Deja convorbirile au intrat în impas prin refuzul Hamas de a accepta menţinerea primului ministru Fayyad.

În fapt, Salam Fayyad a reuşit un succes remarcabil în Cisiordania. Creşterea economică  este ridicată, şomajul relativ redus, paşi reali au fost făcuţi în combaterea corupţiei, creşterea transparenţei bugetare, în educaţie, sănătate publică şi asistenţă socială etc.. În consecinţă, guvernul său este perceput ca eficient de către donatorii internaţionali, inclusiv UE, FMI şi Banca Mondială. Toate acestea nu sunt suficiente pentru a asigura moştenirea politică a preşedintelui Abbas şi succesul electoral al Fatah, respectiv o soluţie politică stabilă şi unitară pentru Palestina. Dinamica legată de decizia din septembrie pune aparent avantajul momentului în curtea AP şi Fatah. În ce măsură acest lucru se va conserva în cazul unor ample şi violente manifestaţii rămâne de văzut. Post septembrie Israel poate să vină cu un răspuns unilateral demersului unilateral al palestinienilor. Dacă alege calea improbabilă, dar nu imposibilă de a denunţa acordurile de la Oslo, anexează coloniile din zona C şi se retrage, lucrurile pot să ia o turnură nefavorabilă pentru AP şi Fatah. Se redeschide calea unei competiţii directe în teren între Fatah şi Hamas. Aceasta nu e este o evoluţie dorită de comunitatea internaţională, cvartet şi donatori.

Şi de partea israeliană lucrurile sunt complicate. Daca preşedintele Shimon Peres s-a întâlnit în repetate rânduri cu omologul său palestinian, premierul Netanyahu a intervenit pentru a opri aceste demersuri după acordul dintre Fatah şi Hamas. Disensiunile interne israeliene legate de colonii şi de costul acestora sunt ridicate. Israelul a avut în ultima săptămână cele mai mari manifestaţii publice de treizeci de ani încoace. Guvernul Netanyahu părea că face faţă excelent provocărilor aduse de criza economică mondială şi de schimbarea climatului de securitate după căderea regimurilor autoritare în ţări arabe. Astăzi se află în faţa unei imense provocări interne cauzată de marasmul politicii israeliene şi eşecul politicilor sociale. Ceea ce a adus în stradă aceste mulţimi, majoritar provenite din rândul clasei medii, nu sunt doar nemulţumiri economice. Pentru prima dată de mult timp, problema supravieţuirii este legată nu doar de ameninţarea externă, ci de identitatea internă a unui stat evreiesc Israelian.

Un comentator israelian spunea recent că Netanyahu poate să facă istorie folosind contextul intern, regional şi internaţional pentru a realiza un acord de pace. Experţii sunt însă sceptici. Toate ofertele sunt pe masă. Există enorme dificultăţi reale în faţa premierului Netanyahu. Subiectele eterne ca securitatea, apa, întoarcerea refugiaţilor, frontierele sunt pe agendă, dar simbolic şi practice, cele mai importante sunt legate de coloniile israeliene şi mai ales de statutul Ierusalimului. Aceste lucruri sunt complicate de faptul că se proiectează pe fondul unei deteriorări a situaţiei de securitate pentru Israel, atât în flancul sudic spre Egipt, cât şi în ceea ce priveşte situaţia din Siria şi programul nuclear Iranian. Numai că natura procesului politic israelian, aceea care a adus în stradă sute de mii de oameni, face ca influenţa internă a unor minorităţi vocale să fie uriaşă şi să acţioneze ca drept de veto.

Peste toate acestea se profilează priorităţile securitare ale SUA în regiune. Există o schimbare marcată de discurs şi atitudine între administraţia Bush şi Obama în ceea ce priveşte procesul de pace. Obiectivele şi principiile fundamentale sunt neschimbate. În pofida discuţiilor pe această temă, interesele americane în regiune şi nu lobby-ul evreiesc pro-israelian de la Washington determină poziţionarea Congresului. Presiunea alegerilor din SUA accentuează poziţia exprimată a liderilor republicani. În realitate însă, majoritatea americanilor, nu doar lobby-ul pro-israelian şi dreapta creştină, susţin această poziţie americană pro-israeliană. Problema este crucială pentru establishment-ul politic american şi defineşte esenţa interesului său naţional. În condiţiile destabilizării regiunii, această relaţie strategică este cu atât mai importantă. Aceste circumstanţe, precum şi dificultatea gestionării proceselor de transformare politică a întregii regiuni, limitează libertatea de manevră a administraţiei. Atât preşedintele, cât şi secretarul de stat Hillary Clinton, au criticat ferm şi au descris drept provocatoare şi neconstructive deciziile israeliene legate de ridicarea moratoriului privind construcţia de locuinţe israeliene în teritoriile palestiniene ocupate. Cu toate acestea, SUA nu au mijloace eficiente de presiune în acest subiect care să nu declanşeze o reacţie virulentă bipartizană în Congres şi să fie considerate ca incompatibile cu interesele sale regionale de securitate.

Discursurile preşedintelui Obama, cel de la Cairo şi mai ales cel ţinut anul acesta la Departamenul de Stat, au făcut valuri, cu toate că nu reprezentau o modificare de facto a poziţiei SUA. Trimiterea la Palestina în frontierele dinainte de 1967 nu a rămas fără un răspuns retoric. Netanyahu a punctat în Congresul SUA, contestând principiul frontierelor înainte de 1967 ca fiind imoral şi practic neaplicabil. În acelaşi timp, el a afirmat că statul Israel este dispus la concesii importante. Reacţia ultra favorabilă a membrilor Congresului a indicat clar de ce SUA nu vor susţine necondiţionat această presiune şi nu vor accepta un compromis legat de Ierusalim, refugiaţi şi chiar teritorii. Ceea ce pare o discuţie interminabilă pe semantică are implicaţii majore la masa negocierilor şi mai ales privind cine şi cu ce agendă o sa fie în jurul ei după 2012.

În timp ce Israel construieşte o realitate în teren, palestinienii construiesc una politică. Ei adună aliaţi între vechi susţinători necondiţionali şi noi parteneri internaţionali sătui de eşecurile repetate ale negocierilor de pace şi nemulţumiţi de tratamentul palestinienilor sub ocupaţie israeliană. UE nu are o poziţie comună pentru că, spune Înaltul Reprezentant Catherine Ashton, nu are pe ce. Deocamdată nu există un text de rezoluţie sau o propunere pe care statele membre să agrege sau nu o poziţie. Pe de altă parte, pe substanţa discuţiilor este clar că statele membre au poziţii divergente. Ca membru al cvartetului, UE este parte din eşecul reluării negocierilor. Cu dubla sa reprezentare în CS, UE are influenţă. Germania a anunţat în iunie prin vocea cancelarului Merkel că nu va susţine demersul palestinian, încercând în acelaşi timp să utilizeze la maxim rolul său de principal donator european al AP pentru a-i convinge pe palestinieni să renunţe la demers. De asemenea, Polonia, Italia, Cehia, Olanda şi Slovenia nu sunt inclinate să susţină votul. Alte state membre ca Franţa, Spania, Suedia dar şi Irlanda şi Portugalia au semnalat susţinere faţă de demersul AP. Marea Britanie nu a decis încă. Este probabil că dacă se ajunge la vot, cel puţin o parte a statelor membre au să se abţină. Această ambiguitate nu facilitează în nici un fel evoluţia spre negocieri. Ceea ce e important este dacă UE poate să vină cu o poziţie comună sau coerentă, care să asigure împreună cu SUA o majoritate morală.  O poziţie care să creeze presiune incontestabilă pentru reluarea negocierilor. Rusia susţine poziţia palestiniană. Australia este în plină discuţie internă contradictorie între premierul Julia Gillard şi ministrul de externe Kevin Rudd. Pentru fiecare stat, poziţia este un amestec de interese specifice, uneori triviale, principii şi valori dar şi opinie publică.

Pentru AP nu există cale de întoarcere de la vot. Investiţia politică şi retorică e prea mare pentru Fatah pentru a călca pe frână. În consecinţă, un vot omogen şi o strategie comună SUA – UE reprezintă calea eficientă de a utiliza oportunitatea ce se ascunde în acest eşec cumulativ al abordărilor parţiale. Dacă vestul decide o asemenea abordare şi pune condiţii părţilor, atât Israelul cât şi AP au motive suficiente de compromis. Acest lucru poate să aibă implicaţii şi la nivelul CS. Un vot la AGNU, în orice direcţie, presupune şi o strategie de gestiune a zilei de după. UE şi SUA vor putea să aibă o voce şi influenţă în ce va urma dacă ansamblul resurselor financiare, politice şi militare apar ca fiind în acţiune conjugată. Forţa morală a votului vestului rămâne influenţa. Divizat, votul americanilor şi europenilor nu are nici o valoare. Dacă este un da, acesta trebuie să fie precedat de gesturi importante din partea palestiniană şi mai ales de Hamas, ceea ce probabil nu se va întâmpla. Dacă este un nu, atunci Israel trebuie să indice cu anumită claritate acele compromisuri de care vorbea premierul Netanyahu în faţa Congresului.

Ce face România? Poziţia sa formală de susţinere pentru o soluţie negociată şi nu unilaterală a fost afirmată atât în cursul vizitei ministrului român de externe la Ramalah, cât şi în timpul vizitei premierului Netanyahu la Bucureşti. Dar acestă analiză susţine că România poate mai mult. Păstrând toate proporţiile, ca şi SUA, România are argumente pentru interesele sale regionale în Orientul Apropiat şi procesul de pace. Dincolo de raţiuni de securitate, care sunt mai puţin evidente dar nu inexistente, România are o tradiţie de angajare în regiune mai mult sau mai puţin echilibrată. Aceasta este în parte fondată pe pretenţiile şi ambiţiile hipertrofiate ale regimului Ceauşescu, care a cheltuit miliarde pentru a avea influenţă în regiune. Pe de altă parte, rolul special jucat de România în timpul anilor 70 şi 80, ca o breşă în politica de bloc a tratatului de la Varşovia, a făcut să fie un partener credibil pentru statele din regiune şi SUA. România a fost legată economic de ţările Arabe dar şi de Israel. Sfârşitul războiului rece şi participarea sa în 2004 la conflictul din Irak au schimbat dinamica. Astăzi, aceste relaţii sunt sumare, în declin şi în pierdere de tracţiune. Motivele acestei pierderi de relevanţă în regiune merită o analiză în sine şi sunt paralele schimbării perspectivelor şi atitudinilor în politica externă a României în ultimii douăzeci de ani. Cu toate acestea, din raţiuni demografice, culturale, politice şi economice, dar şi strategice pentru România, stabilitatea Orientului Apropiat este extrem de importantă. Ceea ce este cert este că în Israel sunt sute de mii de evrei care îşi au originea din România sau foste teritorii româneşti, la care se adaugă un număr mare de muncitori migranţi, cetăţeni români de etnie română sau maghiară, care lucrează în Israel. De asemenea, în SUA există o comunitate semnificativă de evrei de origine din România. În oglindă, România are cetăţeni în ansamblul statelor arabe din regiune, inclusiv în teritoriile palestiniene şi cetăţeni arabi în număr semnificativ locuiesc în România. Nu în ultimul rând, poziţia României este interesantă pentru Washington, pentru care este un partener de securitate în regiune. Pentru toţi aceştia, poziţia României este importantă şi asta creează obligaţii politice şi morale pentru clasa politică şi autorităţi.

Dacă UE are să aibă o poziţie comună, România are motive importante să o urmeze. Dacă în schimb nu se reuşeşte, România probabil se va abţine de la vot. Este cea mai proastă alegere. Cu certitudine, România nu are să fie singură în această postură. Iar votul în sine, cum arătam de la început, nu va schimba mare lucru. Implicaţiile politice ale procesului şi evoluţiile în teren sunt cele care au să creeze realităţi şi efecte. La acestea trebuie să reacţioneze România şi UE, nu doar la elementele politice şi juridice legate de chestiunea suveranităţii şi recunoaşterii statului palestinian la ONU. Pacea nu poate să vină fără compromisuri. Iar cele două părţi trebuie să fie susţinute activ în a lua decizii dureroase şi complicate. Acest lucru nu se poate face prin abţinere, iar un vot poate să fie compatibil atât cu interesele Israelului, cât şi cu dorinţele legitime ale palestinienilor. Dacă România îşi propune să fie consecventă cu poziţiile sale legate de soluţia a două state care coabitează paşnic în baza unui acord negociat, andorsat de cvartet şi comunitatea internaţională, atunci ea trebuie să-şi promoveze cu argumente poziţia de a nu susţine o soluţie unilaterală. România trebuie să fie o voce activă în cadrul discuţiilor dintre statele membre şi aceasta nu poate să plece de la o abţinere. România trebuie să-şi folosească toate resursele pentru o poziţie comună a SUA şi UE.

Reluarea negocierilor de pace şi o soluţie pentru problema israelo-palestiniană ar aduce un avantaj strategic României în relaţia dintre Orientul Apropiat şi Europa. Până atunci, însă, întrebarea este mai puţin noi cu cine votăm, ci mai ales dacă avem o claritate a perspectivei, a exprimării interesului naţional în această regiune şi dacă clasa politică este măcar interesată de aceste subiecte nu doar complexe, ci şi imprevizibile.

Andrei Ţărnea

O versiune a acestui articol a aparut in numarul Septembrie/Octombrie al Foreign Policy Romania